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Privacy is a big concern in current video surveillance systems. Due to privacy issues, many strategic places remain unmonitored
leading to security threats. The main problem with existing privacy protection methods is that they assume availability of accurate
region of interest (RoI) detectors that can detect and hide the privacy sensitive regions such as faces. However, the current detectors
are not fully reliable, leading to breaches in privacy protection. In this paper, we propose a privacy protection method that adopts
adaptive data transformation involving the use of selective obfuscation and global operations to provide robust privacy even
with unreliable detectors. Further, there are many implicit privacy leakage channels that have not been considered by researchers
for privacy protection. We block both implicit and explicit channels of privacy leakage. Experimental results show that the
proposed method incurs 38% less distortion of the information needed for surveillance in comparison to earlier methods of
global transformation; while still providing near-zero privacy loss.
1. Introduction
In order to perform privacy-preserving CCTV monitoring,
video data should be transformed in such a way that the
information leaking the identity is hidden, but the intended
surveillance tasks can be accomplished. The traditional
approach of data transformation has been to detect the
regions of interest (RoI) in the images (e.g., human faces)
and selectively obfuscate them. This approach is an unreli-
able solution as the RoI detectors may sometimes fail. For
example, even if a face detector is able to correctly detect the
face in 99 (out of 100) frames, the undetected faces in the
remaining frame will reveal the identity of the person in the
video and result in his/her privacy loss.
In other set of works, global operations have been used
for data transformation in which the whole video frame is
transformed with same intensity, that is, same amount of
blurring or quantization [1]. This approach is more appro-
priate in the context of data publication, where the published
surveillance video is used by researchers for testing their algo-
rithms. In contrast to the data publication scenario, CCTV
monitoring scenario has diﬀerent requirements. In the case
of CCTV monitoring, a human operator is required to watch
the surveillance video feeds; although automated techniques
may run in the background as shown in Figure 1. The
automatic analysis can be performed using the original data,
which is not accessible for viewing, unlike data publication.
The original data may be encrypted and stored in a database
which can be retrieved later in the event of emergency
situations. The RoI information obtained using the detectors,
along with the transformed data, can be presented to the
human operators. Further, the RoI information can be used
to adapt data transformation. We take this opportunity to
explore an adaptive data transformation approach to com-
bine the benefits of both selective obfuscation and global
operations.
In this paper, to overcome the nonreliability of the RoI
detectors, we examine the suitability of an adaptive approach
of data transformation in order to provide near-zero privacy
loss in a CCTV monitoring scenario. In the proposed privacy
protection framework, data transformation is performed in
two stages. In the first stage, automatic detectors (mainly









Figure 1: The automatic algorithms run on the original data. A transformed version can be showed to the CCTV operators.
blob and face detectors) are applied on the data for detection
of evidences. The results from these detectors are used to
adapt the global operation. The adaption is done in two
dimensions: spatial (by using a space variant operation)
and temporal (by providing a failure time window to the
detectors). For privacy loss assessment, we adopt the model
proposed in [2], as it considers both implicit and explicit
identity leakage channels.
The main contributions of the paper are the following:
(i) an adaptive data transformation approach that uses
space variant operations is proposed, which provides
a near-zero privacy loss with minimal visual distor-
tion;
(ii) the proposed method provides robust privacy preser-
vation even with low-accuracy detectors.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. We com-
pare proposed work with previous works in Section 2. In
Section 3, we describe proposed privacy protection method.
Experimental results are analyzed in Section 4, and paper is
concluded in Section 5.
2. Related Work
Most researchers [3–10] have used selective obfuscation to
preserve privacy in surveillance videos. They have adopted
the traditional approach, which is to detect the region of
interest (e.g., face or blob) and hide it. Since this approach
is limited by the accuracy of detectors, privacy cannot be
guaranteed.
In Table 1, we present a comparison of the proposed
work with other works in the following aspects: whether
implicit identity leakage channels (e.g., location, time, and
activity information) have been used for assessing privacy
loss; whether a tradeoﬀ between privacy loss and visual
distortion of the whole frame due to data transformation
has been examined, and which of the approaches (selective
obfuscation or global operations) has been adopted. As
shown in Table 1, our work is diﬀerent from the works of
other researchers in many aspects. First, we examine the
implicit identity leakage channels, which have been ignored
in the past. Second, the proposed privacy preserving method
presents a tradeoﬀ between utility and privacy in a given
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Qureshi [10] No No SO
Saini et al. [2] Yes No
No
transformation
Proposed work Yes Yes SO and GO
SO: selective obfuscation; GO: global operations.
CCTV monitoring scenario. Finally, the proposed method
examines an adaptive approach for data transformation. We
use face and blob detectors to detect the regions in the image
that need to be obfuscated. However, the inaccuracies of
these detectors is overcome by adapting operations spatially
as well as temporally in the video.
We diﬀerentiate the contributions in the paper from our
past work [2] as follows. While in [2], we introduced the
notion of implicit identity leakage channels and provided a
computational model for identity leakage and privacy loss,
in this paper we examine the appropriateness of data trans-
formation operations in order to block these identity leakage
channels. One approach could be to globally transform
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the data to provide a tradeoﬀ between the privacy loss and
utility loss. However, global data transformation operations
are not appropriate in a CCTV monitoring scenario since
the global operations introduce large amount of visual dis-
tortions in the video. Therefore, in this paper we propose
an adaptive data transformation approach that combines
benefits of selective obfuscation and global operations to
provide robust privacy with minimal distortion. Further, we
provide a tradeoﬀ between the visual distortions due to data
transformation and the privacy loss of the people present in
the video.
3. Privacy Protection Method
In the previous works, it is identified that the identity leakage
and privacy loss occur due to presence of the evidences infor-
mation such as who, what, when, and where. An evidence
can be learned from multiple sources. For example, the
where evidence can be detected using text legends, familiar
structures, symbols (company logos), and so forth. In
order to robustly block the identity leakage, we need to
remove/modify all the sources of evidence detection. In a
surveillance scenario, relatively static regions of the camera
view are known as the background, for example, rigid
structures, fixed objects, doors, and exits. Anything that is
not background is considered foreground, which generally
corresponds to the humans walking in the camera view [13].
We observed that some of the sources of identity leakage
are found in the background, while others are part of the
foreground/object itself. Particularly, most of the sources of
where and when evidences are embedded in the background;
while the who and what evidences are usually found in
the foreground. Further, we observe that the surveillance
cameras are generally fixed, resulting in static background
[14]. Since the background is mostly static, the sources
which are part of background can be accurately detected
manually and transformed. The foreground parts need to be
automatically removed as they may appear at varying places
in diﬀerent frames.
Most sources of the evidences can be associated to a
region in the image called evidence regions. For example, a
rectangle encompassing a company logo, that can provide
the company and its location information, is one evidence
region for where evidence. Our aim is to transform the image
such that all the evidence regions are obscured enough to
block the identity information. However, the problem is that
we may not be able to detect these regions accurately due
to the limitations of the automatic techniques [15, 16]. In
the proposed method, these inaccuracies are taken care of by
using spatially and temporally adaptive data transformation.
The quality of the transformed data is measured in terms of
perceptual distortion D, which is computed as
D = 1− SSIM, (1)
where SSIM is the structural similarity index [17]. We use
SSIM value over PSNR because this measure is more con-
sistent with human eye perception [18, 19]. For the sake of
completeness, we first provide a brief overview of selective
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 2: The images are blurred to hide the identity information.
obfuscation and global operations and then describe the
proposed method.
3.1. Existing Approaches
3.1.1. Selective Obfuscation. In these methods, the evi-
dence revealing image regions are selected using computer
vision techniques and subsequently obfuscated. For example,
Figure 3 shows the results of face detection for hiding the
facial information. In the first image the face is detected
properly, which helped in accurately removing the facial
information. However, in the second image the face regions
are incorrectly detected, while in the third image they are
not detected at all. Note that if the face is left undetected
and seen in even one frame, the identity is revealed. Hence,
selective obfuscation methods do not provide robust privacy
preservation.
3.1.2. Global Operations. To overcome the problem of unre-
liable vision algorithms, we can perform generalization on
the whole image. For instance, we can coarsely quantize the
image, scramble the color space, or blur the image. The
problem with these methods is that they are generally too
pessimistic; we need to determine the worst case transfor-
mation parameters (e.g., degree of blurring or quantization)
and blur all the images to that amount, irrespective of the
content of the image. This is in contrast to the fact that
when the person is far from the camera, even little blurring
might be suﬃcient. Figure 2 shows the result of this approach
where the images are blurred to hide faces. From this figure,
we observe that the image background gets distorted even
when the object occupies a small portion of the image.
The background information might be important for a
surveillance person in order to understand the situation.
3.2. Proposed Adaptive Approach. We propose an adaptive
method that uses global transformation according to the
results of selective obfuscation. In this method, we first use
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Figure 3: The results of the blob detection (white rectangle) and
face detection (black rectangle).
face and blob detectors to approximate the location of the
persons in the image and then use space variant operation to
hide the identity. Figure 3 shows the results of blob detection
and face detection on the same data. We can observe that
a blob detector is generally more robust than the a face
detector in detecting the presence of a person; although the
boundaries may not be very accurate, we can still get a good
approximation of the centroid of the region occupied by
the person. This centroid information is used to perform
a space variant operation. In the space variant operation,
the operation parameters vary with the space according to a
profile. Let ri be the image region with evidence information
and ci the most probable (for face presence) point of the





) = Q0 f (Δ(ci, ri)), (2)
where f is the profile function,Q0 is the operation parameter
for the centroid, and Δ is a distance function. In a ramp
profile, for example, the transformation intensity decreases
linearly with the distance from the centroid. This mechanism
has the advantage that even if the approximate location of a
person is determined, the evidence regions can be obscured
with high probability without globally transforming the
image.
The space variant operations are useful when the detec-
tors are unable to detect the evidence regions correctly, but
only provide an approximation of the region which can
cause evidence detection. However, sometimes the detectors
completely fail to detect persons in the video. We analyzed
the failure pattern of the blob detector over a number of
videos and made the following observations:
(i) when the person enters the camera view, the back-
groundmodel-based blob detector detects the person
reliably;
(ii) the detector may fail to detect a person due to noise
or lighting changes, and so forth;
(iii) themaximumnumber of contiguous frames in which
the blob detector fails is limited.
One such failure pattern is shown in Figure 4 in which
the person enters the camera view in 71th frame and leaves in
910th frame. The detector fails for the following frames: 220
to 230, 460 to 495, 710 to 740, and 810 to 830. To model this
failure pattern, we define a failure window ω. If the number
of contiguous frames in which the blob is not detected is less
than ω, we assume that the person is present in the video,
but the blob detector has failed to detect that person. In
this situation we adopt the pessimistic approach and globally
transform the whole image. If no blob is detected for more
than ω contiguous frames, we conclude that the person
has left the camera view and there is no need for a global
transformation.
Note that our aim is to reduce the privacy loss when the
data is presented to the surveillance operator for viewing.
The automatic algorithms can still work on the original data,
but human beings can only see the transformed data.
Nonetheless, in emergency situations, a person with author-
ity can access the original data. Figure 1 shows how the pro-
posed method can be deployed in a surveillance system.
3.2.1. Description of Algorithm. The evidence regions can be
divided into two groups:
(i) static evidence regions: these are the regions of the
background that provide us evidence which can lead
to identity. Let Rs = {rs1, rs2 . . .} be the set of back-
ground evidence regions, which include any text
legends, landmark or famous buildings, name plates,
addresses, symbols and logos, and so forth;
(ii) dynamic evidence regions: these are the foreground
regions that provide who and what evidence. Let
Rd = {rd1 , rd2 , . . .} be the set of image regions detected
as foreground using blob and face detectors. Each
region is defined by a centroid, width, and height.
Dynamic evidence regions may vary with time; there-
fore, these are calculated on-the-fly for the current
frame.
The proposed method is described in Algorithm 1. The
algorithm takes a video V and set of static evidence regions
Rs as input and returns the transformed video V ′. The
important steps of the algorithm are explained below.
Statement 3. The function DSR() estimates the dynamic
evidence regions using blob and face detector. To detect the
evidence regions, we tune the thresholds of the detectors to
minimize the number of false negatives. In the experiments
we show that we are able to obtain very low number of false
negatives.
Statements 4 to 13. If no foreground is detected, there can be
two cases: (1) there is no foreground region in the image; (2)
the detector failed to detect the foreground. Whether current
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Input: Original Video: V = { f1, f2 . . .}
and set of static evidence regions: Rs = {rs1, rs2 . . .};
Output: Transformed Video: V ′ = { f1′ , f2′ . . .}
Description:
1: for all fi ∈ V do
2: // Detect dynamic evidence regions
3: Rd = DSR( fi);
4: if Rd == EMPTY then
5: if Rd == EMPTY for previous ω frames then
6: f ti = COPY( fi);
7: for all rsj ∈ Rs do
8: f ti = ST( f ti , rsj);
9: end for
10: else
11: //Do the global transformation




16: //Transform static regions
17: f ti = COPY( fi)
18: for all rsj ∈ Rs do
19: f ti = ST( f ti , rsj);




22: //Transform dynamic regions
23: for all frame rdk ∈ Rddo
24: //Calculate parameters for space variant operation
25: PRM = PE(rdk )
26: if !MARK( f ti , r
d
k )then
27: f ti = DT( f ti , rdk ,PRM);
28: end if
29: end for
30: //Data transformation over
31: end if
32: //Copy frame to output frame sequence
33: fi′ = COPY( f ti );
34: end for
35: return Transformed frame sequence fi′ as Video V ′;
Algorithm 1: Adaptive data transformation.
frame belongs to the first case or the latter case is determined
by examining the DSR() output for the previous ω frames.
If we do not detect any foreground regions in the previous
ω frames, then it is very likely that there is no person in
the image; hence, we only transform the static regions. On
the other hand, if some foreground is detected within last ω
frames, there are more chances of existence of a person in
the image. In this case, we take the pessimistic approach and
globally transform the whole image. In the function ST(),
the static evidence regions of the images are obscured using
a suitable transformation operation. An evaluation of three
operations, namely, blurring, pixelization, and quantization
is provided in the experimental results. Similarly, GT()
transforms the entire image globally.
Statements 17 to 21. When the foreground is detected, we
selectively transform static and dynamic evidence regions. In
this case, we first do the static transformation and then pass
the image for transformation of dynamic evidence regions.
Statements 23 to 29. In these steps we transform the dynamic
regions of the image. Only those regions are selected for
the transformation that are not obscured during the static
transformation. The dynamic transformation is done in two
steps. In the first step, parameters of the dynamic region rdi
(centroid, height, and width) are used to estimate (PE())
a probable area (PRM) (circular in our case), where the
evidence could exist. The details of the parameter estimation
are discussed in the experiments section. This area is then
space-variantly transformed according to the probability of
finding evidence information, that is, the subareas where
the probability of finding evidence is less, they are trans-
formed with less degree and vice versa. This space variant
transformation operation (e.g., blurring, pixelization, etc.) is
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performed in function DT(); an implementation of which
will be discussed with the experiments.
Space variant operations incorporate operating context
in data transformation. For example, if the detectors being
used are less accurate, a bigger area can be selected for
dynamic transformation. Since the degree of transformation
decreases with the distance from the center, we do not com-
promise much in the quality. By analyzing the frames over
a temporal window and selecting a proper transformation
function, we are able to accommodate temporary failures of
the detector.
4. Experimental Results
We performed five experiments to demonstrate the eﬃcacy
of the proposed privacy protection method. In the first
experiment we highlight the eﬀect of nonfacial information
on privacy loss. We also provide an evaluation of blurring,
pixelization, and quantization transformation operations
that are required to remove the static evidence regions,
which provide when and where evidences. In the second
experiment, we show the improved visual quality obtained
using the proposed method for a near-zero privacy loss. It is
shown that the proposed method that adaptively uses selec-
tive obfuscation and global operations is more reliable than
the selective obfuscation alone, and it achieves better quality
than the global transformation alone. It is also demonstrated
how the spatial and temporal adaption can be used to
overcome the inaccuracies of the detectors. In Experiment 3,
we analyze how privacy loss and visual distortion are aﬀected
by varying ω. An attempt to improve the proposed method is
made in Experiment 4 to overcome a special failure pattern
that might occur in a multiperson scenario. Finally, we
validate our conclusions with an experiment on 24 hours of
real surveillance data in Experiment 5.
4.1. Data Set. Five video clips have been considered in our
experiments. The description of the video clips is as follows:
(i) video 1: this video was recorded in a research lab. It
shows name of the lab and two people doing various
activities. The original video was shot for over one
hour consisting of 200 key frames;
(ii) video 2: the video is recorded at the entrance of a
department building. It has multiple where evidences
in the form of text and logo. The video is of 45
minutes length, and it consists of 483 frames;
(iii) video 3: this is again a video recorded at a research lab
where two people are doing some activities. It consists
of 1095 frames;
(iv) video 4: this video was shot at the wash basin in a
canteen. Two people are seen in the video at a time
and it consists of 1520 frames;
(v) video 5: the video consists of 1200 frames which are
taken from PETS data sets [20].
Figure 5 shows the background images for the five video
clips used in this experiment. From the figure it can be














Figure 4: A failure pattern of blob detector, y-axis; 1 mean Detected




Figure 5: The background pictures for five videos. Green box shows
when evidence and blue rectangle shows where evidence.
derived that: in video 1 and video 2, we can detect what and
where evidences; in video 3 and video 4, we can detect what,
where, andwhen evidences; but in video 5, we can only detect
what evidence. To validate the conclusions in real scenarios,
we also use 24 hours of real surveillance footage consisting of
28216 frames (video 6). The video frames are not shown due
to privacy concerns. We can detect what evidence in the real
video.
Experiment 1 (implicit identity leakage and static regions).
A large amount of work assumes that privacy loss only
occurs due to the presence of the facial information in the




Figure 6: The static evidence regions after pixelization (Video 1–
3, Video 2–8, Video 3–6, Video 4–9). Video 5 does not have any


















Figure 7: Diﬀerent transformation operations to obscure the static
evidence regions and corresponding distortion measures. Video 5
does not have any static evidence regions.
image. In this experiment wemainly highlight the limitations
of the earlier privacy protection methods and show how
the evidences found in the image can cause privacy loss
even without facial information. To highlight the eﬀect of
the implicit channels alone, in this experiment we assume
that the face is already removed from the videos and then
calculate the privacy loss based on themodel described in [2].
The associated cluster sizes depend on the scenario in which
the video is recorded; however, for experimental purposes,
we take the following values of clusters: Cwhat = 10000,
Cwhat,when = 3000, Cwhat,where = 20, and Cwhat,when,where = 5.
Table 2: The privacy loss calculation for diﬀerent video clips.
Video Evidences Identity leakage Privacy loss
Video 1 What; where Iwhat,where = 2/20 0.119
Video 2 What; where Iwhat,where = 1/20 0.018
Video 3 What; where; when Iwhat,where,when = 2/5 0.880
Video 4 What; where; when Iwhat,where,when = 1/5 0.119
Video 5 what Iwhat = 6/10000 0.002
In Table 2 we present the privacy loss that might occur from
these video clips even when the face is not present.
It can be observed that if the adversary has the prior
knowledge of the clusters, the nonfacial information can
also cause significant privacy loss, and, therefore, we need
to remove these evidences from the videos to minimize
the privacy loss. We explore three operations to transform
the static evidence regions: blurring, quantization, and
pixelization. We perform these operations to the degree that
the evidence is not detectable and compare the perceptual
distortion they cause. The static evidence regions of the
videos are shown as green and blue boxes in Figure 5; note
that video 5 does not have any static evidence region. In
Figure 7 we notice that pixelization performs equivalent or
better than blurring and quantization operations. On average
over all the videos, pixelization incurs 8% less distortion
than blurring and 55% less distortion than quantization.
The resulting pixelized images are shown in Figure 6. In the
remaining experiments, we will use pixelization to obscure
static evidence regions. This experiment only removes evi-
dences from static background, we still need to consider who
and what evidences which can be learned from the dynamic
foreground.
Experiment 2 (space variant operation). In this experiment
we examine the use of the techniques to remove evidences
that are detected from the foreground. As mentioned
before, the most common evidences that are found in the
foreground of video frames are what (activities in our case)
andwho (face in our case). The identity leakage throughwhat
alone is negligible, hence we put more focus on the facial
information removal. Also note that removingwhat evidence
can severely aﬀect the intended surveillance objective.
One extreme solution to overcome the nonreliability
of the detectors is to globally transform the image. For
example, we can blur the whole image irrespective of the
location of the face. To evaluate this technique, we applied
the operations on the whole video to the extent, where the
face became unrecognizable in all the frames. Figure 8 shows
the results of blurring and pixelization on the five videos.
We observe that except for Video 5, blurring performs better
than pixelization. This is probably because the distortion in
the case of pixelization increases more rapidly compared to
blurring as the faces are captured more close to the camera.
The dips in the plots show the regions of high activity
with multiple people. However, it cannot be avoided as the
probability of privacy loss is also higher in those frames.



































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: Comparison of distortion due to blurring and pixeliza-
tion for global transformation. If P is the degree of pixelization, and
B is degree of blurring, we got following values: video 1: B = 6 and
P = 4, video 2: B = 13 and P = 8, video 3: B = 12 and P = 8, video
4: B = 12 and P = 8, and video 2: B = 6 and P = 3.
The overall comparison of average distortion values for all
five videos is shown in Figure 9.
The foreground regions only occupy a small part of the
image, hence uniformly transforming the whole image is a
very pessimistic approach. To overcome the non reliability of
the face detectors, we propose to use more robust foreground
detectors (e.g., blob detector) which can be made very
reliable by reducing the threshold values, although at the
cost of increased false positives. We conducted experiments
with GMM-based adaptive background modeling to detect
the blobs [21]. The results of the blob detection are shown
in Figure 10. By reducing the threshold values we are able to
detect foreground in most of the images.
However, transforming only the blob regions has two
problems: (1) in some frames the blob may include the
body of the person but still miss the face, for example, in
Figure 10(a) and (2) the face only occupies small region of
the blob, hence transforming whole blob region may be too




Figure 10: Results of blob detection on five videos. The blob detec-
tion works in the image where face detector fails.
pessimistic. From blob detection results and global transfor-
mation of the images, we make the following observations.
(1) we need to apply more blurring/pixelization to obscure
the frontal faces; however, the degree of blurring/pixelization
could be less when the person is not directly looking at the
camera. (2) the frontal face is generally found at 75% height
of the blob. (3) themissed faces are within 125% of the height
of the blob. These observations inspire us to use a space
variant transformation, where the degree of transformation
varies with the distance from the center of the estimated
facial region.
In the implemented space variant transformation, a
circular evidence region is estimated based on the inaccuracy
of the detectors, and then diﬀerent regions of the circle
are transformed by diﬀerent degrees of the transformation
considering the distance from the center ci (according to
(2)). Based on the observations mentioned in the previous
paragraph, the center (ci) is determined as (Bx + (3/2) ∗
Bh,By + (1/2) ∗ Bw), where (Bx,By) are the coordinates
of the bottom-left corner of the blob with respect to the
bottom-left corner of the image, and (Bw,Bh) are width and
height of the blob. The radius of the circle is approximated
as (max((1 + μ) ∗ Bh, (1 + 2 ∗ μ) ∗ Bw)), where μ is the
fractional error margin which is 0.25 for the blob detector
in our case. A less accurate blob detector would need higher
value of margin μ. The circular region obtained above is
divided into four concentric circles. The value of Q0, that
is, the transformation parameter for the innermost circle is
chosen according to the results of the global transformation
(Figure 9) as follows: Q0 for blurring- 6, 13, 12, 12, and 6;
for pixelization- 4, 8, 8, 8, and 3, respectively for five videos.
The profile function f is chosen to be piecewise linear, and






Figure 11: Key images from the transformed video using the
proposed method. Row 1 shows the outputs of blurring, whereas
row 2 shows the pixelization outputs.
outer circle, the blurring parameter is reduced by 5% and
rounded to the nearest integer. The face detector output is
also used to provide additional robustness. The implemented
face detector provides a square facial region. In this case, the
center is calculated as (Side/2, Side/2), and radius is taken as
max((1 + 2∗ μ) ∗ Side) to account for inaccuracy.
Again, these numbers may depend on the context of the
surveillance and accuracy of the detectors. In the current
experimental settings, these parameters are obtained to give
near-zero privacy loss (no face recognition possible from the
transformed data) for given videos and blob detector.
Now we evaluate the proposed method from the per-
spective of visual distortion. For evaluation of the pro-
posed method, we implement Algorithm 1 (described in
Section 3.2). Figure 11 shows the resulting output images.
The resulting values of the distortion for video clips (of
Figure 11) are shown in Figure 12. The variation in the





















































































































































































































































































Figure 13: A comparison of distortion measure for pixelization and
blurring for all video clips using the proposed method.
distortion is much more in comparison to global transfor-
mation. This is because when no blobs are detected, only
static regions of the video are transformed; resulting in low
distortion. On the other hand, sometimes blobs of large
size are detected (probably due to increased false positive
rate), which cause whole image to be transformed. It can be
observed that even when the whole image is transformed,
the distortion value using space variant method is less.
This is due to the fact that in space variant operations
less probable evidence regions are transformed mildly.It can
be observed from Figure 13 that blurring provides a more
eﬀective solution for transforming the foreground regions.
In Figure 14, a comparison of the proposed method with the
global transformation is provided. The results show that we
get 37% less distortion with proposedmethod in comparison
to global method, still providing robust privacy protection.


























Figure 15: The eﬀect of ω on privacy loss and visual distortion.
For the given video clips, we were able to remove the
evidence information completely since the blob detector in
our case never failed. However, there might be case that a low
threshold blob detector may fail to detect the foreground. In
the next experiment, we explore how diﬀerent values of ω
accommodate this failure.
Experiment 3 (eﬀect of failure window on privacy loss and
visual distortion). In this experiment, our objective is to
find the value of failure window (ω) for which the visual
distortion is minimum for a near-zero privacy loss. We
perform blurring and pixelization operations globally on
ω consecutive frames in the video after the blob detection
fails. Experiment is done with four values of ω: 0, 5, 10,
and 15. The result is shown in Figure 15. As can be seen
in the figure that for the given video (Video 3 in this case)
and the blob detector used in our experiment, at a value of
ω = 10 we obtain a near-zero privacy loss. With this value
of ω, the distortion is less than 0.2 with both blurring and
pixelization operations (although pixelization causes slightly
more distortion than blurring). We have conducted this
experiment only for Video 3 because only this video had such
a failure of the blob detector.
Experiment 4 (when the blob detector fails). The solution pro-
vided in the previous experiment fails in situations, where
one person is detected and other could not be detected. The
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 16: Output images from the pessimistic approach to
overcome the failure of blob detector.
proposed method will only remove one person’s identity.
The other person will be left untransformed, and hence it
might cause privacy loss. In this experiment we simulate such
scenario by considering only the biggest blob detected in
the video. Other blobs are assumed to be not detected. To
improve the privacy loss in such scenarios, we use a very pes-
simistic approach of data transformation. Here we assume
that someone is always there in the video and do global
transformation when no blobs are detected. When the blob
is detected, we do the space variant blurring according to the
previous method; however, the image area outside estimated
evidence region is globally transformed; unlike previous
method where it is left unprocessed. Experiments show
that this method performs better than global operations,
but the perceptual quality is poorer in comparison to the
normal space variant transformation discussed in previous
experiments.
Figure 16 shows the output images for video 3 from
the proposed algorithm. We notice that from Figures 16(a)
to 16(c), we are able to hide the faces eﬀectively even
without global transformation. However, the method’s suc-
cess depends on the scenario and needs fine tuning. For
example, in Figure 16(d) the other person’s face is visible
as it happens to fall in the outermost circle of the space
variantly transformed first blob. Proper selection of the
radius depends on the context and is out of scope of this
paper. The qualitative results of the methods are provided in
Figures 17 and 18. The figure can be compared with Figures
8 and 12 to conclude that the resulting video quality is worse
than the normal space variant blurring is better than global
transformation.
Experiment 5 (validation with real surveillance data). The five
videos used in previous experiments cover various scenarios.
The conclusions made for these scenarios are further vali-
dated by running the proposed method on real surveillance










































































































































































































































































Figure 17: The distortion measures for blurring and pixelization for pessimistic approach.
footage of 24 hours, recorded at The University of Winnipeg.
Since the video consists of 28216 frames, we omit the
detailed distribution of the distortion values and provide
the mean distortion in Figure 19 for the global method, the
proposed method, and the pessimistic approach described in
Experiment 4. A globally transformed background image of
the video is shown in Figure 20. Other resulting figures are
not shown due to privacy concerns.
We find that the results for real data are in agreement
with our earlier conclusions. The proposed method causes
less distortion than global transformation (63%) while
the pessimistic approach causes more distortion than the
proposed approach, though less than the global method.
Further, the distortion caused by blurring is 22% less than
that of pixelization.
4.2. Further Discussion. The main goal of this paper is
to introduce adaptive transformation in spatial as well as
temporal domains to overcome inaccuracies of detectors and
to achieve more robust privacy. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first attempt towards reliable privacy with
unreliable detectors. It is important to note that a tracking
based solution could also be used for temporal adaption;
however, it would again be limited by the accuracy of the
tracker. Also, in real scenarios, it is very diﬃcult to initialize
the tracking with a generic template, and the tracker fails as


































Figure 19: Mean distortion measures for blurring and pixelization
for real surveillance data.
Figure 20: A globally transformed frame of real surveillance video.
soon as the person changes the posture. Therefore, we think
that the proposed adaptive method is more robust.
5. Conclusions
The proposed adaptive approach of data transformation
intelligently hides the evidence information in the video
without much compromise with quality. It also provides
robust privacy despite the inaccuracies of the detectors.
Experimental results are provided to support our claims. For
the CCTV scenario, we explored the adaptive transformation
method to capitalize on the benefits of a global transforma-
tion while adapting it with the output of unreliable detectors.
The following are the important conclusions of the paper:
(i) pixelization is found to be better than blurring and
quantization for transforming static evidence regions
with 8% less distortion than blurring and 55% less
distortion than quantization;
(ii) the proposed method is more reliable than the selec-
tive obfuscation based methods and has 38% lesser
visual distortion than global transformation;
(iii) for foreground transformation using space variant
operations, blurring provides 11% less distortion
than pixelization.
In the future, we want to deploy these methods in real
implementations and perform a user study-based evaluation
of privacy loss and distortion. It would be interesting to know
how much distortion is acceptable to maintain a desired
surveillance quality. Also, we want to extend the work by
modeling the failure pattern of the detectors for the scenarios
with more dynamic background and foreground.
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